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Abstract—Computerized systems are revolutionizing modern
ships’ bridges and maritime operations. Central components in
this are Integrated Navigation Systems (INS) and Electronic
Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) which provide
the maritime navigator with the ship’s position and displays it
in electronic charts. The integrity of these systems if of great
importance for the safety and security of maritime operations,
but is a little studied topic. In this paper we investigate the
integrity of navigation systems, though a survey of INS’s on the
market (n=22), a survey of known cyber incidents and attacks
targeting the integrity of navigation systems, and a discussion of
cryptographical measures to ensure the integrity of navigation
data in INS’s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern ships are equipped with Integrated Bridge Systems
(IBS). An IBS is “a combination of systems which are
interconnected in order to allow centralized access to sensor
information or command/control from workstations, with the
aim of increasing safe and efficient ship’s management by
suitably qualified personnel” [1]. In other words, an IBS is an
integration of systems that enables monitoring and control of a
ship and its operation from the bridge. The systems integrated
usually include navigation systems, communication systems
and engine control systems, but may also be surveillance
systems (CCTV), entertainment systems, and in the case of
naval ships, damage control systems and weapon systems.
These computerized ship’s bridges represent a technological
revolution for the maritime navigation. Historically, the main
task for the navigator was to find and fix the position of the
vessel, while today’s navigator monitors the vessel’s position
obtained by navigation sensors and presented by navigation
software [2].
This paper concentrates on navigation systems. Maritime
navigation systems connected through onboard networks are
referred to as Integrated Navigation Systems (INS) [3]. In an
INS, sensors used in navigation such as GPS, gyroscope, depth
sensors, etc. are connected to workstations equipped with
software for displaying electronic charts, known as Electronic
Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) [4]. The
ECDIS software shows the position of the vessel in the
chart using data from the navigation sensors, as well as the
positions of nearby vessels based on data received through
the Automatic Identification System (AIS) [5]. In addition,
ECDIS software has functionality for route planning and route
monitoring.
It seems obvious that the integrity of INS’s is of great
importance for safe and secure operations in the maritime
domain [2], [6], [7]. Still, little concrete is said about this
in the emerging literature on maritime cyber security. Much
of what is written is on a general level, e.g. applying general
cyber security considerations to maritime systems, or focusing
mainly on policy (see e.g. [8] or [9] for several examples of
both categories). In particular, references to reported incidents,
attacks and vulnerabilities are scarce and the same few exam-
ples are cited again and again.
In this paper we present a survey of the security of INS’s,
with an emphasis on integrity. We start by surveying INS’s
available on the market (n=22) in Section II. Based on the
findings we describe a prototypical INS. Then, in Section III
we survey reported attacks and incidents targeting the integrity
of INS’s, while in Section IV we discuss cryptographic coun-
termeasures. Finally, in Section V we provide conclusions.
II. INTEGRATED NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (INS)
An INS is an integration of navigation sensors with worksta-
tions equipped with ECDIS. This section documents a survey
into INS’s. We start by describing the method of the survey
before we go on to present the findings. Finally, the findings
are used to define a prototypical INS.
A. Method
One INS was studied in detail as part of the development of
a maritime cyber security demonstration (see Section III). For
this INS we had access to an installation of the system, experts
on the system, technical documentation, and capture of internal
network traffic (see [2], [10] for details). Through Internet
searches we identified further 34 providers of navigation and
bridge systems and gathered as much information of their
systems as possible. This resulted in a catalog of mostly
brochures, but in some instances also quite detailed technical
documentation. These brochures and other documents were an-
alyzed to extract information on a number of topics (identical
to the sub-sections of Section II-B).
Among the 35 providers there is a wide range in what is
offered, from full ship integration to navigation sub-systems.
In theory it makes sense to view an IBS as a system of systems
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with the INS as one of its systems. I practice, however, not
all providers make a clear distinction between an INS and an
IBS – perhaps because navigation is such an integral part of
the daily work on a bridge. In order to have a criterion for the
inclusion or exclusion of any given provider’s system (hence-
forth referred to as a “solution”) in the study, we decided that
the minimum requirement to be included was that a solution
provide at least navigation hardware (e.g. workstations and
sensors) and navigation software (e.g. ECDIS). This can be
seen as a working definition of INS’s for the purpose of this
study, even though it may differ from definitions given by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) [3].
Of the initial 35 solution we excluded one providing mar-
itime computers but no navigation system as such (e.g. no nav-
igation software), one providing ship integration systems but
no navigation system, and one providing navigation software
but no hardware. Of the remaining 32 solutions, we judged
that for ten of them the information we were able to find was
too scarce to provide useful answers. These ten solutions were
therefore excluded from the study, and we ended up with a
selection of 22 solutions. A list of the providers of the included
solutions is given in the Appendix.
B. Findings
In the following the findings of the survey are presented,
divided into six topics: Workstations, sensor integration, net-
work, radar, autopilot, and Internet connection.
1) Workstations: All 22 solutions provide workstations for
the crew of the bridge. These are invariably standalone com-
puters running software locally, i.e. what we would think of
as thick clients. In five of the solutions these workstations are
ECDIS consoles, i.e. workstations used for chart display only,
while 15 of the solutions provide multi function workstations
(MFW). MFW’s, often also called multi function displays
(MFD), are workstations which allow the operator to switch
between ECDIS display, radar display and conning display.
For the remaining two solutions it is unknown whether the
workstations are ECDIS consoles or MFW’s. Some of the
solutions are bridge systems that integrate other systems in
addition to navigation systems, but it seems that in most cases
MFW’s are still navigation workstations providing ECDIS,
radar and conning displays, while other functions such as
engine control or CCTV have separate workstations/consoles.
In eleven of the solutions, the operating system of the
workstations is specified as Microsoft Windows, nine as
Windows XP, Windows Vista and/or Windows 7, two as just
Windows. While it must be take into account that many of
the documents collected in the survey are several years old,
this finding is consistent with reports that Windows XP is
often encountered on operating ships [7], [11]. For one of the
solutions, the operating systems is specified as Linux, while for
the remaining ten, the operating system cannot be determined
from the available information.
2) Sensor integration: A main feature of an INS is the
integration, interpretation and presentation of sensory input in
navigation software such as ECDIS. By sensor integration we
understand the means by which data from sensors such as
GPS, gyroscope, echo sounder or AIS receiver are provided
to the workstations. These sensors have serial output, usually
conforming to the IEC 61162-1/NMEA 0183 standard for
maritime navigation devices [12]. The large majority (18)
of the solutions in the study provide some kind of sensor
integration unit, though given different names such as Data
Distribution Unit, Data Acquisition Unit, Data Collection Unit,
Sensor Concentration Unit, etc. Common for these units is
that they receive data from the navigation sensors though
serial interfaces and provide a single source of sensory data
for the workstations. Three of the solutions do not provide
sensor integrator units and thus the sensors have direct serial
connections to the workstations.
3) Network: One of the solutions is a standalone ECDIS
workstation with sensors connected to serial ports. However,
any solution more complex than this will need various compo-
nents communicating somehow; thus the rest of the solutions
are networked in one way or another. Their networks connect
sensor integration units to the workstations, they interconnect
workstations for exchange of data (e.g. sensor data, routes
and chart updates), and they connect the INS to other onboard
systems such as the ship’s communication system. The exact
configuration varies, but in 19 of the solutions the network is
some sort of IP-based Ethernet LAN. Also in the standalone
solution, the workstation is fitted with Ethernet ports enabling
IP-based networking. That IP-based Ethernets are the domi-
nating networking technology in navigation networks is also
confirmed by [13]. One solution employs a CAN-bus network,
a multi-master serial bus system originally developed by the
automotive industry for use in cars [14]. In the remaining
solution the network protocol is unknown. In nine of the
solutions, the networks connecting sensor integration units to
workstations are described as dual or redundant.
Which communication protocols utilized in the navigation
networks are to a large extent unspecified in the information
collected, but TCP is used in at least three solution and UDP
in at least six solutions, including two which claim to adhere
to the IEC 61162-450 “Lightweight Ethernet (LWE)” standard
for shipboard networks. LWE is based on a single switched
Ethernet and UDP multicast [12], [13].
4) Radar: In 16 of the solutions, integration of radar is
described. A radar is different from the other kinds of sensors
in an INS in that its data is in the form of pictures, while
the other sensors transmit numerical and textual data. For this
reason radars are treated differently than other sensors, and
only one of the solutions has radar connected to the sensor
integration unit. Of the remaining 15, twelve have radars
connected to the workstations through a network – either a
separate network or the same network as the sensor integration
units – while in three of the solutions radar is connected
directly to workstations by some other means.
5) Autopilot: A feature described in several (eight) of the
solutions is the integration of an autopilot with the route plan-
ning functionality of the ECDIS software, i.e. the possibility of
having the autopilot steer the ship to follow a route defined in
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Workstations Multi function ECDIS Unknown
15 5 2
Operating system Windows Linux Unknown
11 1 10
Sensor integration Yes No Unknown
18 3 1
Networking Ethernet CAN-bus Unknown
20 1 1
Radar Networked Direct Unknown
13 3 6
ECDIS controlled Yes Unknown
autopilot 8 14
Internet connection Yes Unknown
12 10
the ECDIS. This obviously means that the autopilot unit has to
receive commands from a workstation, and for a couple of the
solutions these commands are described as being transmitted
over the network. Unfortunately, the information collected is
too sparse say anything more concrete on this topic.
6) Internet connection: Navigation charts are updated on
a regular basis; navigation systems therefore need to receive
regular chart updates. Furthermore, third party software such
as the Windows operating system, is also in need of regular
updates and patching. It has been common to install updates
using physical media such as CDs or USB flash drives.
However, ships are now increasingly being equipped with
Internet connections over satellite and/or 4G broadband (for
use when sailing close to shore) [11], [15], [16]. Of the
solutions in the study, twelve report the possibility of providing
the INS with an Internet connection for online chart updates,
in most cases by providing a gateway from the network of the
INS to the communication system of the ship. In five of the
cases it is specified that this gateway is also a firewall.
C. Summary
The findings are summarized in Table I. While there clearly
are variations in the concrete configurations of the different
INS’s, it is also possible to identify a number of typical traits.
We use these to describe a prototypical INS, illustrated in
Fig. 1. The typical situation is that one or more Ethernets
are employed to connect the various components of the INS.
The most central of these components are (multi function)
workstations and a sensor integration unit (or sometimes two
for redundancy), but also radar and autopilot may be connected
to the network. In addition there may be a gateway to other
systems on the ship, which may also include an Internet
connection.
III. ATTACKS AND INCIDENTS
The largest concern with navigation systems has so far been
the threat of GPS spoofing, i.e. attacks where navigation sys-
tems are fooled by the transmission of false GPS signals [17],
[18], [19]. While GPS spoofing can pose a threat toward the
integrity of the GPS position calculated by the vessel’s GPS
receiver and thus a threat toward the integrity of the position
displayed in the electronic charts of the vessel, it is not a threat
toward the integrity of an INS itself.
However, there also exist examples of threats to the integrity
of navigation systems. Electronic charts are often updated
using USB flash drives. E.g. [15] reports of a case in which
an ECDIS console on board a large tanker was infected by
malware when charts were updated in such a way. As we have
seen, INS’s are increasingly often connected to the Internet for
online chart updates. In [11], it is demonstrated how this can
be exploited to launch an attack on navigation software.
In a maritime cyber security demonstration conducted in
August 2017, we infected a workstation of an INS using a USB
device simulating mouse and keyboard. The malware installed
could intercept and manipulate GPS coordinates transmitted
to the workstation from the sensor integration unit through
the network. Thus, the malware could alter the position that
appeared in the ECDIS software (see [2], [10] for details).
A demonstration similar to ours, though using an Internet
connection for delivery, was reported in December 2017 [20].
During our demonstration we also experimented with con-
necting a small computer (Raspberry Pi) to a switch in the
network of the INS. By sending GPS coordinates to the
network we showed that the workstations were not able to
distinguish these coordinates from GPS coordinates sent by
the sensor integration unit. Furthermore, by increasing the
frequency of the transmissions we were in effect able to
override the sensor integration unit.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC COUNTERMEASURES
The performance standards for INS’s from the IMO requires
that the systems implement “integrity monitoring” in the
form of comparison between redundant sources of navigation
data [3]. While this may be sufficient to safeguard against
malfunctioning devices, it seems insufficient for protection
against cyber attacks; if an INS is compromised there is no
reason while data from several sources cannot be manipulated.
In the following we discuss potential crypographic means
to protect the integrity of data in an INS. We restrict the
discussion to data sent from the sensor integration unit to
the workstations, though similar challenges will apply to data
sent from radar to workstations, between workstations, or
from workstations to the autopilot. Based on the prototyp-
ical INS described in Section II-C and the threats implied
by Section III, certain requirements for the cryptographic
countermeasures can be derived: (1) It seems reasonable to
assume that data is distributed by multicast; thus the coun-
termeasures should be suited for multicasts. (2) Although we
have documented that Internet connections are increasingly
common, this cannot always be assumed; we therefore want
the countermeasures to work also for offline/air-gapped sys-
tems. (3) The countermeasures should protect against man-in-
the-middle attacks (manipulation or fabrication of navigation
data). (4) The countermeasures also should protect against
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Fig. 1. Prototypical Integrated Navigation System
replay attacks (navigation data captured and retransmitted at
a later point in time). (5) While the sensor integration unit
may be assumed to be a hardware device, workstations must
be assumed to be regular computers running (potentially old
and unpatched) Windows installations; we therefore want the
countermeasures to provide protection even when workstations
are compromised.
Requirements (1) and (3) point toward a solution using
public key cryptography. The sender (i.e. the sensor integration
unit) cryptographically signs the messages with a private
key while the multiple receivers (workstations) verify the
signatures using a copy of the corresponding public key.
Requirement (4) can be obtained by including a sequence
number or time stamp in the signed messages. Requirement (2)
will rule out a standard PKI solution relying on an online
Certificate Authority (CA). Drawing on insights from wireless
sensor networks (WSN) there seem to be two main options:
(A) A simplified PKI solution with a single root CA, or (B)
an identity-based signature scheme [21].
In option (A), a key-pair of a secure key sk and a public key
pk is generated and installed in the sensor integration unit. pk
is signed by the secure key skCA of an offline root CA (e.g.
the INS provider or the shipowner) to produce a certificate
C for the sensor integration unit. C is installed in the sensor
integration unit and distributed to the workstations through
the network. The certificate CCA of the CA is installed in
the workstations, which use CCA to verify C and C to verify
messages from the sensor integration unit.
Option (B) is an identity-based signature scheme [22]. In
this scheme the secret key sk is generated by a offline key
generator center (again, the INS provider or shipowner) from
a random seed known only to the center, and the identity i
of the sensor integration unit (e.g. a serial number or MAC
address). As in (A), pk is installed in the sensor integration
unit, which uses it to sign messages. In difference from (A),
the identity i is in itself the public key; no certificate is needed
as its authenticity can be assured by inspection. i is installed
in the workstations and used to verify the messages of the
sensor integration unit.
One challenge remains. In both cases the integrity of the
means of verification (CCA is case of (A) and i in the case of
(B)) must be ensured once installed in the workstations, but
requirement (5) prevents us from relying on their operating
system for this. We suggest the solution may be to store
these values in tamper proof Hardware Security Modules
(HSM) [23] from which the ECDIS software can retrieve them
(or possibly perform the verification in a secure environment).
Application of removable HSM’s may also ease the distribu-
tion and installation of the certificates or identities.
Clearly, none of the options provide a 100 % guarantee for
the integrity of the navigation data. Under the assumption that
the workstations may be compromised, no such guarantees
are possible. If an adversary can manipulate the operating
system of the workstations, then he/she can potentially also
manipulate the navigation software. However, we still hold
that the suggested cryptographic countermeasures will add
a layer of security, as we can reasonably assume that the
manipulation of an proprietary ECDIS application will be
harder than the manipulation of an insufficiently protected
Windows installation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As Integrated Navigation Systems (INS) and Electronic
Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) become the
standard on modern seagoing vessels replacing the traditional
paper chars, the integrity of these systems become increasingly
important for the safety and security of maritime operations.
This paper has made an investigation into the integrity of
currently available INS’s. This investigation has taken the
form of a survey into 22 INS’s available on the market, as
well as a survey of known cyber incidents and attacks with
consequences for the integrity of navigation systems. These
surveys show that in general, the integrity of INS’s is not
sufficiently protected.
Based on the survey of INS’s we described a prototypical
INS. This prototypical INS was used as the basis for a dis-
cussion of cryptographical measures to improve the protection
of the integrity of navigation data in INS’s. This discussion
provided a set of requirements, and two possible option for
their fulfillment: A simplified PKI solution and an identity-
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based solution, both combined with the use of Hardware
Security Modules (HSM). While guaranteed security is un-
obtainable, we believe cryptographic countermeasures as we
have sketched represent a potential for improving the integrity
of INS’s.
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